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Abstract
The demand for cash balances of financial intermediaries that establish contractual
liabilities with credit-sensitive customers is characterised. As stated by Merton, the
success of the business activities of such firms crucially depends on their credit quality.
They are thus obliged to rely on deposit insurance and capital cushions in order
to assure that their promised payments are free of default. Unlike the Merton’s
approach, the optimal guaranteeing contract is formulated in actuarial terms in this
paper, because in this way the model can be extended to consider the situation
of firms that can only hedge up to a limited extent. Within this framework, the
equilibrium in the market determines the rate at which a unit of capital is exchange
by a unit of risk, or, in other words, it determines the market price of risk. Episodes
of liquidity crises are meaningful in this theoretical setting.
Key words: The cost of capital; Liquidity preference; Quantity theory; Financial
instability; Liquidity crises.
JEL-Classification: E41, E44, G14, G15.
1 Introduction
Investors holding financial securities with random outcomes are exposed to unknown
balances equal to the differences between the market values of outstanding assets and
liabilities. When positive, such surpluses can be lent at the overnight interest rate in
order to avoid keeping idle money. Short-term debt can be attracted, on the other hand,
when a net loss is suffered. Modigliani and Miller (1958) have noticed that, since in perfect
capital markets such operations can be performed without restrictions, rational decision-
makers — who are assumed to maximise value — should demand no cash holdings, for
it is costly and provides no benefit. However, frictions in capital markets can prevent
this mechanism to fully operate in practice. As a matter of fact, premiums are normally
charged on market prices depending on credit-ratings and the size of loans, evidencing
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that the cost of debt restructuring can be incremented when the magnitude of losses
increases up to certain levels. Those firms that cannot afford such extra costs are forced
to default. Under such circumstances, the financial position and so the performance of
companies are affected by their capital structure.
Merton (1997) proposes a model to determine the price of insuring liabilities estab-
lished by opaque financial intermediaries with credit-sensitive customers — where credit-
sensitivity characterises the attitude of individuals expecting that promised payments
are delivered with certainty, while opacity refers to the fact that the business activities
of financial institutions are normally unknown to outsiders. Customers are additionally
assumed to show aversion-to-risk and to lack the expertise to diversify and to hedge ef-
ficiently. Thus the role of financial intermediaries is that of providing insured liability
contracts to customers that cannot continuously modify their portfolios. The efficiency of
such services crucially depends on the perceptions of customers about the credit quality
of the intermediary.
A fundamental assumption in the model of Merton is that financial intermediaries can
hedge continuously and efficiently and that they can accordingly sell this service to their
customers. But what is the situation in markets where even the most solvent institutions
can only hedge up to a limited extent? After all, every financial company stops relying on
trading at some limit and prefer to call instead for reinsurance and risk capital cushions.
An actuarial approach is proposed in this paper to describe this situation, according to
which (in a similar way to that adopted by Merton, 1974 and 1977), the optimal surpluses
of shareholders and guarantors are respectively determined at the levels where the value
of the firm is maximised and where the cost of bankruptcy is minimised. Then, as
demonstrated in Section 2, the optimal levels of reserves are determined by the quantile
functions of the series of capital returns of the intermediaries’ portfolios.
The total cash balance demanded by the market is defined in Section 3 as the sum of
the surpluses demanded by customers and financial intermediaries. The cost of capital
is then determined in order to satisfy the necessary condition that the total demand for
capital is equal to the total balance supplied by creditors. As demonstrated in Section 4,
such equilibrium actually determines a set of combinations of the supply of capital, the
total balance spent on the transaction of securities, the rate of interest r, and the pair of
the expected return and the volatility of the market portfolio.
On these grounds, the cost of capital in financial markets is defined by the probability
that the market capital loss surpasses the ratio of the supply of cash balances to the
volume of funds spent in the transactions of securities, or, in other words, it is equal to
the probability that the cash-guarantee maintained at the aggregated level is insufficient
to cover the total realised loss. Alternatively, it can be interpreted as the return to
be paid for holding a given uncertain claim instead of investing on a non-risky zero-
coupon bond with a predetermined maturity. Such a rate corresponds to the return to be
obtained when investing one monetary unit on the underlying risk and can accordingly
be regarded as the Internal Rate of Return on Risk (IRRR). Therefore, every pair of
equity and transactions volume determines a Risk-Structure of Interest Rates over the
plane of expected returns and volatilities, providing the price to be asked for exchanging
a given risk for equity. Such structure of interest rates is studied in Section 5.
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The analysis of the elasticity of the demand for cash balances with respect to the
interest rate and the shape of the risk-structure of interest rates in Sections 4 and 5
leads to a precise description of financial markets in terms of the capital flows and the
risk-parameters of the market portfolio. More specifically, the derived expressions for the
preference for liquidity and the internal rate of return on risk, which are dependent on ob-
servable variables, can be regarded as measures of the liquidity conditions in the market.
On the grounds of a partial equilibrium approach, different states can be compared, thus
allowing to distinguish the more stable and the more vulnerable to violent adjustments.
The empirical analysis carried on in Sections 6, 7 and 8 illustrates the kind of represen-
tation that can be obtained from the model. In particular, the liquidity crises occurred
in October 1987 and April 2000 (the Black Monday and the dot-com bubble) can be sat-
isfactorily interpreted in terms of the paths followed by the empirical expected returns
and volatilities of the series of capital returns of the corresponding indexes. Section 9
concludes the paper.
2 The Optimal Demand for Cash Balances
According to Merton (1997), the capital structure affects the value of firms that establish
contractual liabilities with customers who are sensible to the default-risk implicit in their
deposits. Such customers are characterised by the unwillingness to share the risk taken
by intermediaries — even if they were offered a fair premium reduction — a situation
that is aggravated due to the fact that the business activities of financial companies are
usually unknown to outsiders, i.e. these institutions are opaque to outsiders. Addition-
ally, customers are supposed to lack the expertise required to diversify or to hedge by
themselves, and they are also assumed to face higher transaction costs. By contrast, the
investors in the stocks and bonds issued by financial companies agree to afford the cost of
bankruptcy, provided they are compensated by the appropriate expected return. In this
context, the role of financial intermediation is to attract funds from risk-neutral investors
and from averse-to-risk customers to hold financial assets. The success of this kind of
firms critically depends on their ability to assure to their customers that the promised
payments will be made with certainty.
Three different strategies are available to provide protection against default-risk: hedg-
ing, insuring and risk-capital cushions. In the model of Merton (1997), intermediaries
show preference for hedging. Two different option-based contracts are then established,
one involving the firm and stockholders and delivering the excess of the value of net assets
(equal to assets minus liabilities) over the level of cash holdings, and another involving the
firm and some external guarantor, who guarantees the cash flows promised to customers.
The surplus S of the intermediary is then represented by the market value of net assets,
which is supposed to follow a Brownian motion. Then both the value of the firm and the
value of the guarantee are contingent on the value of net assets. The optimal contracts
established with shareholders and guarantors can thus be respectively established in or-
der to maximise the value of the firm and to minimise the cost of bankruptcy (see also
Merton, 1974, 1977).
However (as already stated by Merton, 1997), the distinction between intermediaries,
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guarantors, customers and investors can be difficult in actual financial markets. As a
matter of fact, some financial institutions acting as guarantors to some firms or individual
investors, can be customers of or investors in other companies. Eventually, every financial
institution will stop relying on hedging and will seek for reinsuring and risk capital to
assure the solvency of its business activities. The capital structure of this kind of firms
will be next characterise. As in the model of Merton, two contracts will be defined,
one involving the maximisation of the value of the firm, and the other involving the
minimisation of the cost of insolvency. But since these will be now supposed to be
insuring contracts, an actuarial setting will be required.
In order to establish these contracts in formal terms, let us assume that every intermedi-
ary holds a net-portfolio combining capital and some Gaussian exposure X, characterised
by a pair of expected return and volatility (µ, σ) and corresponded to the series of (ran-
dom) capital Profit and Losses (P&L) of the value V of the underlying fund. Since each
monetary unit invested on risk produces the percentage return X, the total P&L accrued
by the underlying fund must be equal to:
L ·X = L ·∆V with Xt = Vt − Vt−1
Vt−1
∀t
where the variable L denotes the amount of funds spent on transactions. The random
variable X can be certainly related to the surplus S defined by Merton, but recall that
X has been expressed in percentage terms — in such a way that the absolute return is
also dependent on the transactions volume.
Let us additionally express the magnitude of the guarantee, in the following denoted
by K, as a proportion k of the transactions volume, such that K = L ·k. The agreements
established by the financial intermediary are then defined in the following way. On the
one hand, stockholders supply the balance K = L · k with the promise of receiving the
return in excess (X − k) if the firm is solvent, i.e. if X > k. On the other hand, the
firm establishes a contract with some insurance company that promises to pay the excess
of loss (X + k) when bankruptcy is declared, i.e. when X < −k. Hence the payments
delivered to stockholders and received from guarantors at the end of the investment period
are respectively equal to L · (X − k) and L · (X + k).
As long as the amount of capital K could be alternatively invested in some fixed-term
deposit to obtain the return r ·K, the total benefit Y S delivered to stockholders and the
total cost Y G endured by the guarantor and the firm at the end of the investment period,
per unit spent on securities, are respectively given by:
Y S = (X − k) + r · k when X > k
Y G = −(X + k) + r · k when X < −k
which can be equivalently expressed as:
Y S = (X − k)+ + r · k = max(0,X − k) + r · k
Y G = (X + k)− + r · k = −min(0,X + k) + r · k
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Whenever −k ≤ X ≤ k, no capital gains are obtained and additional debt is required to
pay the guarantee back, though the size of the losses is bounded by the level of reserves.
Stockholders are expected to sell their shares or to call for restructuring in this case.
On these grounds, two different kind of firms can be distinguished. There are, in
the first place, firms that seek to maintain their relationship with stockholders in the
best terms and accordingly seek to maximise the return Y S . In the second place, there
are firms more concerned about their relationship with guarantors and customers that
accordingly prefer to minimise the return Y G. While those firms belonging to the first
group can be regarded as speculative firms, as long as their focus on profits may lead
them to implement more aggressive investment strategies, those in the second group can
be regarded as precautionary firms, as long as their objective is to reduce their exposure
to risk to a minimum.
Since the capital return X is represented by a random variable, both Y S and Y G are
also represented by random variables, which means that the optimal surpluses should
be determined based on the expected values of the residual exposures E[(X − k)+] and
E[(X + k)−]. Recall that any random variable can be equivalently represented by its
cumulative probability function FX or its tail probability function TX , functions that are
related to each other through the fundamental identity:
TX(k) = P [X > k] = 1− P [X ≤ k] = 1− FX(k)
Besides, in a Gaussian setting, both functions can be expressed in terms of the cumulative
probability Φ of the standard Gaussian, whose mean return and volatility are respectively
equal to zero and one:
TX(k) = 1− FX(k) = 1− Φ
(
k − µ
σ
)
(1)
In fact, the Gaussian cumulative and tail probability function are explicitly defined as:
FX(k) = P [X ≤ k] =
∫ k
−∞ dFX(x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
· ∫ k−∞ exp [−(x−µ)22σ2 ] dx
TX(k) = P [X > k] =
∫ +∞
k
dFX(x) =
1
σ
√
2pi
· ∫ +∞
k
exp
[
−(x−µ)2
2σ2
]
dx
(2)
Applying the mathematical definition of the expectation operator we obtain that:
E
[
(X − k)+
]
=
∫ +∞
+k
(x− k) · dFX(x) = 1
σ
√
2π
·
∫ +∞
+k
(x− k) · exp
[−(x− µ)2
2σ2
]
dx (3)
and also:
E
[
(X + k)−
]
= −
∫ −k
−∞
(x+k) ·dFX (x) = − 1
σ
√
2π
·
∫ −k
−∞
(x+k) ·exp
[−(x− µ)2
2σ2
]
dx (4)
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Let us now investigate how the optimal balance of precautionary firms is determined.
These firms minimise the expected loss endured by the guarantor in case of default plus
the opportunity cost of capital, and thereby solve the following optimisation problem:
min
k
E
[
(X + k)−
]
+ r · k (5)
Applying the Leibniz integral rule for the differentiation of a definite integral whose limits
are functions of the differential variable,1 we obtain from Equation 4 that:
∂
∂k
E
[
(X + k)−
]
= −
∫ −k
−∞
1 · dFX(x) = −T−X(k)
Then the first-order condition of the problem of Equation 5 leads to:
∂
∂k
E
[
(X + k∗)−
]
+ r = −T−X (k∗) + r = 0
The second-order condition additionally implies that the functional E [(X + k)−] is in
fact a convex function of the level of capital and hence, that the optimal proportional of
capital k∗ actually leads to a minimum value of the optimisation criterion:
∂2
∂k2
E [ (X + k)−] = −d T−X(k)
dk
> 0 ∀k
The optimal cash balance of precautionary firms is then equal to:
kµ,σ(r) = σ · Φ−1(1− r)− µ (6)
Consequently, the optimal capital demand of precautionary firms always follows a non-
increasing and continuous path, for both the cumulative function Φ and its inverse are
non-decreasing and continuous functions of their arguments. Discrepancies relative to
preferred cash-balances are thus explained on the basis of the underlying risks and the
opportunity cost of capital. Besides, the minimum and maximum levels of surplus are
respectively demanded when r ≥ 1 and r ≤ 0.
Speculative firms, on the other hand, maximise the expected excess return and accord-
ingly solve the following optimisation problem:
max
k
E
[
(X − k)+
]
+ r · k (7)
1According to this rule:
∂
∂z
Z
v(z)
u(z)
f(x, z) dx =
Z
v(z)
u(z)
∂f(x, z)
∂z
dx + f (v(z), z) ·
∂v(z)
∂z
− f (u(z), z) ·
∂u(z)
∂z
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But again the second-order condition leads to the existence of an optimal capital propor-
tion that minimises (and does not maximise) the optimisation criterion:
∂2
∂k2
E [ (X − k)+] = −d TX(k)
dk
> 0 ∀k
Hence every unit invested on risk capital represents an undesired burden for speculative
firms, which produces an average loss that can be explicitly determined:
E [X+] > E [ (X − k)+] + r · k =⇒ E [X+]− E [ (X − k)+]
k
> r
As long as the average cost they incurred when supplying capital is higher than the
alternative interest r they have to pay for attracting funds in the market, speculative
firms maintain no reserves at all — as predicted by the Modigliani-Miller proposition. As
a conclusion, financial intermediaries only demand capital due to precautionary motives,
and they do it according to the optimal level specified in Equation 6.
From the actuarial point of view, the term E
[
(X + k)−
]
represents the excess of loss
suffered by the issuer of some insuring policy covering the loss of the mutual fund X,
where the retention or deductible is equal to k. Such a contract is known as a layer in the
actuarial literature. The deductible is introduced in these contracts in order to assure
that the holder of the policy will take every reasonable care to reduce the probability
and the magnitude of losses. It then explicitly accounts for the moral-hazard inherent in
the agreement — because insurers cannot directly observe the behaviour of policyhold-
ers. On these grounds, the optimal cash balance, as determined by Equation 6, can be
corresponded to the optimal retention or optimal deductible of the related deposit insur-
ance contract. In the next section, the aggregated money demand of the market will be
characterised by the sum of the optimal balances determined at the microscopic level.
3 The Aggregate Demand for Cash Balances
The amount of reserves demanded by the market will be characterised in the following
by adding the cash balances maintained at different levels of aggregation, going from
investors and small firms, to big companies, conglomerates, industries and economic
sectors. Assuming that the individual exposures are distributed as Gaussians with means
µ1, . . . , µn and volatilities σ1, . . . , σn, we obtain from Equation 6 that the optimal balances
demanded by precautionary firms are given by:
ki(r) = σi · Φ−1(1− r)− µi ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (8)
Summing up these balances we obtain that the total level of reserves KM demanded by
the market is equal to:
KM =
n∑
i=1
Li · ki(r) = Φ−1(1− r) ·
n∑
i=1
Li σi −
n∑
i=1
Li µi
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where L1, . . . , Ln denote the amounts of funds spent in each of the risks X1, . . . ,Xn.
Define L = L1 + · · ·+ Ln as the total funds spent in the market, in such a way that:
KM = L ·
(
Φ−1(1− r) ·
n∑
i=1
Li
L
σi −
n∑
i=1
Li
L
µi
)
Hence the contributions of the individual exposures to the aggregate demand for cash
balances are given by the coefficients ω1, . . . , ωn, defined as:
ωi =
Li
L1 + · · ·+ Ln ⇔ Li = ωi · L ∀ i = 1, . . . , n
Consequently, the liquidity-preference of the market kM = KM/L must be defined as:
kM (r) = kµ,σ(r) = σ · Φ−1(1− r)− µ (9)
with:
µ =
n∑
i=1
ωi · µi and σ =
n∑
i=1
ωi · σi
Note that assuming that the optimal surpluses are determined by Equation 8 does
not necessarily imply that investors solve an optimisation problem before deciding their
cash balances. However, as long as for every fund an optimal balance exists, there are
incentives to accordingly adjust the capital structure, for big departures from this level
can produce important losses and eventually lead to bankruptcy. Simple calibration and
backtesting can be used to attain this objective. Thus, whatever the mechanism imple-
mented to determine their levels of capital — going from a rule of thumb to complicated
mathematical modeling — firms will be assumed to approach as much as possible to the
optimal levels corresponded to their portfolios. On these grounds, a weak version of the
hypothesis of rational behaviour is proposed, according to which the successive aggre-
gate states will be characterised by adding the risk-based contributions of investors who
combine equity and financial assets trying to build optimal portfolios.
The model of liquidity-preference presented so far can be regarded as an alternative
to the utility maximisation approach, according to which the demand for liquidity is
represented by the surplus demanded by some representative rational decision-maker
who maximises her or his expected utility (see e.g. Choi and Oh, 2003, and Holmstrom
and Tirole, 2000). This approach is first suggested by Tobin (1958) when characterising
liquidity-preference as behaviour towards risk.
The following problems arise, however, when implementing the utility maximisation
approach. Thus, in the first place, the expressions derived for the money demand from
the first-order condition are not easy to work with and they cannot then be clearly in-
terpreted in terms of measurable economic variables. Secondly, recall that a parametrical
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expression has to be determined for the utility function, as well as for the parameter repre-
senting the aversion-to-risk of the decision-maker. Since this coefficient is not observable,
the model eventually depends on exogenous variables that have to be determined on a
subjective basis. As a consequence, every event of significance (involving adjustments
beyond expected) has to be explained on the basis of exogenous events, like the sudden
release of relevant information or the sudden change in the mood of investors — from
risk-aversion to risk-loving or in the opposite direction. Therefore, and as a final point
of criticism, the expected-utility framework cannot satisfactorily account for the whole
of the recorded historical events — such that, in particular, it provides no satisfactory
explanation for the liquidity crises occurred in the past.
A great part of the criticism made for the utility approach can be avoided by adopt-
ing the characterisation of the preference for liquidity proposed in this paper. Indeed, a
simple mathematical expression is provided in Equations 8 and 9 to describe the money
demand — i.e. the quantile function of the probability distribution describing the un-
derlying risk. Moreover, as established in the first-order condition, the optimal amount
of capital is corresponded to an optimal exchange between a flow of probability and the
return offered by a certain flow of cash. Such representation reinterprets the Tobin’s
(1958) characterisation of liquidity-preference as behaviour towards risk. Additionally,
the market money demand explicitly depends on the mean return and the volatility of
the series of capital returns of the market portfolio in the new model, which are certainly
observable variables.
The question remains, however, of whether the model can satisfactorily explains the
evolution of the preference for liquidity in normal times as well as in times of turbulence.
Before providing an answer to this question, I will ask the reader to wait until Section 6.
First, in the next section, the cost of capital will be determined on the basis of a balances
equilibrium.
4 The Cost of Capital as Determined by the Equilibrium
in the Market of Cash Balances
According to the model developed in Sections 2 and 3, the determinants of the money
demand in a close financial market are of two kinds. Firstly, since the optimal levels
of reserves explicitly depends on risk and risks are represented by probability functions
belonging to the class of Gaussian probability distributions, the optimal surplus are ulti-
mately determined by the mean return and the volatility of the series of capital returns
of the market portfolio. Besides, by imposing the market balance to be equal to the sum
of the balances demanded by investors, the mean return and the volatility of the market
portfolio are expressed as the sum of the corresponding parameters representing the series
of capital returns at the microscopic level (as stated in Equations 8 and 9). The other
variable affecting the money demand is the cost of capital, defined as the return that
allows investors to borrow or lend balances in the market.
We will additionally assume in the following that the total supply of cash holdings
is controlled by some group of creditors, and the cost of capital will be determined in
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order to satisfy the necessary equilibrium condition that the flow of funds supplied to
the market is equal to the aggregate balance demanded by intermediaries. Accordingly,
letting M denote the total amount of capital supplied by creditors and letting L (as in
Section 2) denote the total amount of funds invested on securities, the following equation
must hold (see e.g. Friedman, 1970, and Howells and Bain, 2005):
M = Kµ,σ(r) = L · kµ,σ(r)
Replacing the liquidity-preference function kµ,σ(r) according to Equation 9, we obtain
that:
m :=
M
L
= σ · Φ−1(1− r)− µ (10)
where the ratio m = M/L represents a cash-to-risk ratio, which can be also interpreted
as a supply-to-demand for transactions ratio or a relative credit supply. The equilibrium
in the market of cash balances can be equivalently established in the following terms:
R :=
m+ µ
σ
= Φ−1(1− r) ⇔ r = 1− Φ
(
m+ µ
σ
)
(11)
Within this context, both M and L are control variables — hence both lenders and
borrowers can affect the monetary equilibrium. The expected return and the volatility
of the market portfolio, on the other hand, can be regarded as variables of state, for
they reflect the impact over the market of maintaining the current levels of supplied and
demanded balances. Finally, the interest rate of equilibrium can be also considered as a
state variable that is related to an optimal exchange of cash holdings and exposition to
risk in the market.
The ratio R thereby represents the rate at which firms agree to exchange the sure
flow (m+ µ) for a unit of volatility and can accordingly be regarded as the market price
of risk. It can then be regarded as an alternative measure of risk to the Sharpe ratio,
which, as it is well-known, is equal to the slope of a straight line relating the expected
return to the volatility of every financial security transacted in the market, in such a way
that µ = r + S · σ (see Sharpe, 1964 and 1966). Unlike the Sharpe ratio, however, the
measure R is respectively induced to rise and to diminish in response to inflationary and
deflationary trends, respectively characterised by increasing and decreasing m. Such a
difference is a consequence of the fact that, while in the model of equilibrium of William
Sharpe firms can borrow or lend any amount of capital at the interest rate r, in the
alternative equilibrium condition established in Equation 11 the liquidity conditions are
determined by the relative supply m. Accordingly, within any class of risks with the
same market-price, different stocks of cash are necessarily corresponded to different risk-
parameters.
The rate r = TX(m) = 1 − Φ(R) additionally represents the return obtained when
investing one monetary unit on the underlying risk and can be accordingly regarded as
the Internal Rate of Return on Risk (IRRR). Thus, while the Internal Rate of Return
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(IRR) of a zero-coupon bond represents the opportunity cost of receiving a cash-flow
at some future date instead of today (see, for example, Hull, 2000), the IRRR can be
interpreted as the return to be paid for holding a given uncertain claim instead of investing
on a non-risky zero-coupon bond with a predetermined maturity.
From the strictly mathematical viewpoint, the IRRR corresponds to the probability
that the current stock of reserves suffices to cover the expected imbalance of the market
portfolio. In fact, the lower the IRRR, the lower the tail-probability that the excess of
loss of the market portfolio was greater than the real money-supply. Such a situation is
consistent with (overnight) markets where investors face less difficulties to adjust their
end-of-day balances or equivalently, more liquidmarkets. By contrast, the tail-probability
of the market portfolio increases with the IRRR and so markets are more illiquid the
greater the IRRR. Moreover, the higher the money spent in transactions with respect to
the stock of capital in a given market, the higher its corresponding IRRR, since in this
case the expansion of output is, to a greater extent, nominal in nature or, equivalently,
more inflationary. Conversely, less inflated funds, characterised by greater cash-to-risk
ratios, are assigned lower internal returns.
Figure 1: Interest Rate Elasticity of the Optimal Demand for Cash Balances.
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Finally, a word can be said about the instability of balances markets. In fact, as long
as the market parameters are determined by Equation 10, changes in any of the control
variables M and L must be followed by adjustments in µ, σ and the IRRR in order to
reestablish the balances equilibrium. In the particular case when the mean return and
the volatility of the market portfolio remain unchanged, variations in the preference for
liquidity can be explicitly established in terms of interest rate adjustments:
∆kµ,σ(r)
kµ,σ(r)
= ǫ(r) · ∆r
r
with ǫ(r) =
r
kµ,σ(r)
· dkµ,σ(r)
dr
where the coefficient ǫ(r) represents the elasticity of the demand for cash balances with
respect to the interest rate — equal to the percentage variation in demanded cash bal-
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ances in response to a percentage movement in the interest rate. From Equation 9, we
obtain that the dependence on risk of the interest rate elasticity is in fact expressed as a
dependence on the mean-to-volatility ratio µ/σ:
ǫ
(
r,
µ
σ
)
= −r
√
2π exp
([
Φ−1(1− r)]2
2
)
·
[
Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
]−1
(12)
The sign of the elasticity thereby depends on the state parameters, in such a way that:
ǫ
(
r, µ
σ
)
< 0 ⇔ Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
> 0 ⇔ r < 1−Φ (µ
σ
) ⇔ kµ,σ(r) > 0
ǫ
(
r, µ
σ
)
> 0 ⇔ Φ−1(1− r)− µ
σ
< 0 ⇔ r > 1−Φ (µ
σ
) ⇔ kµ,σ(r) < 0
When r = 1 − Φ (µ
σ
)
, the magnitude of the elasticity is infinite, meaning that at this
point the whole adjustment is produced in quantities.
In this context, the level r = 1−Φ (µ
σ
)
represents a turning-point in capital markets that
separates two different environments: the first one satisfying kµ,σ(r) > 0 and ǫ
(
r, µ
σ
)
< 0,
and the second one, characterised by kµ,σ(r) < 0 and ǫ
(
r, µ
σ
)
> 0. As depicted in Figure
1, the interest rate elasticity is negative and non-increasing in r when r < 1−Φ (µ
σ
)
, but
it is positive and U-shaped when r > 1 − Φ (µ
σ
)
. An asymptote is produced at the level
r = 1−Φ (µ
σ
)
, which is located to the left of the axis r = 0.5 when µ > 0 and to the right
of the axis r = 0.5 when µ < 0. Hence, the market is the most unstable when the internal
return on risk approaches to the level r = 1−Φ (µ
σ
)
. Moreover, the greater the magnitude
of the mean-to-volatility ratio, the more the asymptote respectively approaches to the
axis r = 0 and r = 1 when µ > 0 and when µ < 0.
A complete characterisation of the dynamic of the market would require to describe
the variation of the preference for liquidity in terms of the variations in all of the state
variables. Besides, since every cash-to-risk ratio m is corresponded to a set of parameters
(µ, σ, IRRR), multiple equilibria are allowed and then additional conditions are required
— determining an optimal path or a most probable state — in order to predict the future
state of the market. The developing of such a model is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, as long as the set of different combinations of the parameters which are com-
patible with the monetary equilibrium for a given relative stock m are determined by
Equation 10, it is still possible to describe the possible states of the market on the basis
of a static approach. As will be proved soon in Section 5, a risk-structure of interest rates
can be defined in this way, providing the optimal return of exchange between risk and
money in a market characterised by a given pair of expected return and volatility.
5 The Risk-Structure of Interest Rates
Let us consider in the following some capital market that follows a certain regime with
m = constant. A risk-structure of interest rates on the plane of mean returns and
12
volatilities is then determined by Equation 10, where each rate represents the return to
be asked for receiving a sure cash-flow instead of some uncertain payment. Accordingly,
as depicted in Figure 2, at any fixed level of volatility, the expected return and the internal
rate of return on risk are inversely related. On the other hand, recall that the market
price of risk is incremented when the IRRR decreases and vice-versa (as established in
Equation 11). Consequently, within a class of securities showing the same variability,
risks offering different expected returns can be assigned the same IRRR (or the same
market price) only if more equity is supplied to the portfolio containing the fund with
the lower expected return. This result ultimately provides a theoretical explanation of
why investors show liquidity-preference.
Figure 2: The Risk-Structure of Interest Rates as a Function of the Expected Return.
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In Figure 3, the evolution of the internal return is shown as a function of the market
volatility, given different fixed levels of the expected return. Thus, as depicted in the
upper graph of Figure 3, within a class of securities offering the same positive expected
return, the IRRR always rises with variability, at the time that for every level of volatil-
ity, the IRRR diminishes when the supply-to-demand ratio is increased. Consequently,
the market price of risk can be inflated both by pumping liquidity and by reducing the
variability of the market portfolio — relations that are compatible with economic intu-
ition. In the lower graph of Figure 3, the risk-structure is shown for a class of funds
13
offering negative expected returns. Note that the relationship between internal returns
and volatilities is inverted when the surplus is lower than the expected loss, in such a way
that in this range higher internal returns (or lower market prices) are obtained for lower
volatilities.
Figure 3: The Risk-Structure of Interest Rates as a Function of Volatility.
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Notice that the following relationships are additionally obtained from Equation 11:
IRRR > 0.5 ⇔ m+µ
σ
< Φ−1(0.5) = 0 ⇔ µ < −m
IRRR < 0.5 ⇔ m+µ
σ
> Φ−1(0.5) = 0 ⇔ µ > −m
Hence the case IRRR > 0.5 is corresponded to the situation when the average capital
loss endured by the market portfolio is higher in magnitude to the relative stock m, while
the case IRRR > 0.5 is related to the situation when the magnitude of the average
capital loss is lower than the relative stock m. Accordingly, the cases IRRR > 0.5
and IRRR < 0.5 respectively characterises insolvent and solvent market portfolios. The
asymptote separating both trends at the axis r = 0.5 corresponds to the case when the
demanded and supplied levels of reserves are equal in magnitude. Besides, σ → +∞
when IRRR → 0.5, no matter whether this level is approached from the left or the
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right of the axis r = 0.5. Indeed, maximum uncertainty can be expected around the
level IRRR = 0.5, for at this point the market portfolio is not solvent, as in the case
IRRR > 0.5, nor insolvent, as in the case IRRR < 0.5, so that its credit quality is not
determined.
Some general rules concerning the evolution of the market can thus be given by using a
partial equilibrium approach. Indeed, notice on the one hand, as shown in Figure 2, that
the equilibrium expected return tends to the cash-to-risk ratio (so that the market price
of risk tends to zero) when the IRRR tends to 0.5 (see Equation 11). On the other hand,
as depicted in Figure 3, the internal return on risk tends to the value r = 0.5 when the
volatility tends to infinite. Besides, the more the IRRR approaches to 0.5, the greater
the volatility adjustment that is required to account for a same absolute variation in the
IRRR. Consequently, the model predicts the appearance of volatility jumps in response
to movements in the IRRR if this variable is close enough to the level r = 0.5. Moreover,
since the concavity of the curve relating the IRRR to σ increases as the risk-to-cash ratio
is diminished and the curve eventually degenerates when m = 0, more drastic volatility
movements are expected for lower ratios.
In conclusion, the mean return and the volatility of the market portfolio, as well as
the internal return on risk, can be regarded as physical properties of markets, which at
equilibrium are connected to each other according to Equation 10 for any given level of
the relative stock of money m = M/L. Consequently, the equilibrium depends on the
interactions between borrowers and lenders on the one hand, who respectively control the
demand and the supply of capital, and the response of the market on the other, which can
be regarded as the involuntary output of the decisions simultaneously and independently
made by investors, intermediaries and monetary authorities, and which is corresponded
to the probability distributions describing the processes of percentage returns. The fact
that µ and σ are observable variables that can be measured on the base of historical data,
implies that the model can be empirically tested. This task will be performed in the
coming sections.
6 Empirical Evidence
The theoretical approach presented in the previous sections can be applied to characterise
the cost of capital in different economic contexts. Thus, for example, at the corporate
level, it can be used for the design of a capital allocation mechanism in financial conglom-
erates (as proposed by Dhaene et al., 2003, Goovaerts et al., 2005, and Mierzejewski, 2006
and 2008). In this case, the Gaussian random variables Xi represent the capital P&L
of the portfolios maintained by the business units and the IRRR represents the internal
cost of capital, i.e. the return to be imposed on the transactions of cash balances inside
the institution. Alternatively, at the macroeconomic level, the model can be applied to
deduce a (theoretically justified) expression for the money demand of the economy. In
this situation, the aggregate exposure X should be related to the series of capital P&L
of the level of nominal income.
But the model can be also used to describe the equilibrium in some closed market of
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balances, where a total stock of cash M is supplied by creditors and stockholders. Finan-
cial intermediaries, on the other hand, spend the (nominal) quantities Li on securities
and demand equity up to the optimal levels ki(r) defined in Equation 8, in such a way
that the total demand for capital in the market is equal to L ·kµ,σ, where kµ,σ denote the
market liquidity-preference (defined in Equation 9), µ and σ denote the risk-parameters
of the market portfolio and L represents the total volume spent on the transactions of
securities.
Figure 4: Twenty Years of Evolution of the DowJones and the Nasdaq Composite
Indexes and their Corresponding Daily Transacted Funds.
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Assuming, in addition, that all the relevant information for investment decisions is con-
tained in the values assigned in the stock exchange, the series of capital returns of the level
of prices in this market should determine the riskiness of the market portfolio. This will
be the framework adopted in the following for the empirical verification of the model. The
variables under analysis will be the DowJones and the Nasdaq composite indexes, which
respectively represent the industrial and the Information & Technology (IT) sectors of the
economy of United States. The daily valuations of these indexes are depicted in Figure
16
4, together with the amounts of funds daily spent on transactions in the corresponding
sectors. The data have been obtained from http : //www.yahoo.com/finance.
Two episodes of crisis are clearly distinguished in Figure 4, occurring in October 1987
and April 2000, and respectively known as the Black Monday and the dot-com bubble. In
fact, on Monday October 19th, 1987, the DowJones lost more than 25% of its value to
recover only about 5% the day after, thus accumulating in one week, in the two consecutive
days, losses over 40% and 35% respectively. TheNasdaq, in the meantime, lost more than
10% of its value the same day and nearly 10% the day after, thus accounting for weekly
losses around 20% and 30% on October 19th and 20th respectively. These are among the
most severe declines observed during the whole past century. A striking feature of the
episode is the short time that took the bubble to explode and its lack of fundamentals,
for no major news or events appeared during the prior days to the crash.
Unlike the stock crash of October 1987, the episode of April 2000 mainly affected the
IT companies. In fact, while the DowJones attains a maximum at 11, 722.98 points on
January 14th, 2000, and then falls until reaching 9, 811.24 points on March 14th, 2000,
the Nasdaq attains a maximum at 5, 048.62 points on March 10th, 2000, and then falls
until reaching 3, 400.91 points on May 31st, 2000, in this way respectively accounting
for losses of 35% and 15% approximately. It can be also noted in Figure 4 that the
funds demanded for transactions followed a growing path during the nineteen nineties,
a fact that is consistent with the liberalisation of capital markets and the expansionary
monetary policy followed by the Federal Reserve Bank in that period (see Figure 6).
Moreover, although the total inflows of capital are shared in roughly equal parts most of
the time, such a tendency is abandoned in the period starting shortly after April 1999
and extending until shortly before April 2003. It is well-known, indeed, that towards the
mid-nineties, a sentiment of growing confidence about the future of the dot-com firms
predominated. As a consequence, the credit conditions were facilitated to this industry,
both through the reduction of premiums and controls, as through the publishing of new
stock.
Let us then investigate whether the trends followed by the mean returns and the
volatilities of the series of capital returns of the DowJones and the Nasdaq, respectively
depicted in the upper and the lower rows of Figure 5, are consistent with the balances
equilibrium described by Equations 10 and 11. The mean returns have been estimated as
the average of the daily percentage variations of the indexes observed in the past ninety
working days, while the volatilities have been calculated as the mean standard error:
µt =
1
90
·
t∑
i=t−89
Xi and σt =
√√√√ 1
90
·
t∑
i=t−89
(Xi − µt)2
Thus, in the first place, every peak in the volumes of funds spent on assets shown in the
second row of Figure 4 should be corresponded to a pair of mean and volatility adjust-
ments in Figure 5. By comparing both figures, we can verify that this is indeed the case.
In particular, the peaks of trading activity occurred in October 1987 and April 2000 are
accompanied by the major changes in the risk parameters. As a matter of fact, the volatil-
ities of the series of percentage returns of the DowJones and the Nasdaq respectively
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multiplied by more than three and more than four times in October 1987, while their
mean returns suddenly felt from levels around +0.1% to levels around −0.3%. Regarding
the episode of April 2000, there is no evidence of turbulence in the DowJones, for only
small variations in the risk-parameters are observed — as it is expected indeed, since this
index did not burst on that date. The volatility of the Nasdaq, in the meantime, was
amplified 1.5 times approximately, although the major adjustment affected its expected
return, which between February 2000 and May 2000 felt from a historical maximum over
0.6% to a level around −0.1%.
Figure 5: Expected Returns and Volatilities of the Series of Capital P&L of the
DowJones and the Nasdaq Composite Indexes.
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Other facts predicted by the model can be empirically verified. In fact, from Equation
11, we obtain that if the IRRR is rising (i.e. if the market price of risk is diminishing)
while the relative supply m = M/L is constant, either the expected return must be
reduced or the volatility must augment. By contrast, if the IRRR is diminishing (i.e.
if the market price of risk is rising) while the relative supply m = M/L is constant,
either the expected return must augment or the volatility must be reduced. On these
18
grounds, we can say that under any of the combined regimes (µ ↓ , σ ↑) and (µ ↑ , σ ↓),
the risk-parameters push the market in the same direction: i.e. the IRRR is incremented
and the market price of risk is reduced in the former case, while the IRRR is reduced
and the market price of risk is incremented in the later. In any different situation,
i.e. either when (µ ↓ , σ ↓) and when (µ ↑ , σ ↑), the effects of the mean return and
the volatility compensate each other. We then conclude that the most severe liquidity
adjustments should be characterised by sudden movements of opposite sign affecting the
risk-parameters. Several episodes occurred between October 1984 and April 2004 follow
this pattern, like those observed in October 1990, April 1998 and April 2002, as well as
in the stock crashes of October 1987 and April 2000 (see Figures 4 and 5).
Figure 6: Federal Funds Rate.
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
Oct-84 Oct-85 Oct-86 Oct-87 Oct-88 Oct-89 Oct-90 Oct-91 Oct-92 Oct-93
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
 
F
u
n
d
s
 
R
a
t
e
 
(
F
F
R
)
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
Apr-94 Apr-95 Apr-96 Apr-97 Apr-98 Apr-99 Apr-00 Apr-01 Apr-02 Apr-03 Apr-04
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
 
F
u
n
d
s
 
R
a
t
e
 
(
F
F
R
)
To complete the description of the monetary equilibrium, still the paths followed by the
liquidity-preference function and the internal rate of return on risk have to be analysed.
This will be done in the next sections by separately considering two different settings.
Thus, first the level of the rate of interest will be regarded as given in Section 7 (as in a
competitive framework), so that the adjustments in markets will be exclusively produced
in quantities, i.e. they will exclusively affect the variables M and L. Next in Section 8,
the cash-to-risk ratio m =M/L will be fixed, in such a way that the equilibrium will be
reestablished by exclusively affecting the IRRR.
7 Maintaining Equilibrium with Quantity Adjustments
We will suppose in the following that firms can exchange their overnight balances at
the Federal Funds Rate, whose evolution is depicted in Figure 6. In other words, we
will assume that depositary institutions (the only financial institutions that are legally
allowed to directly execute transactions with the Federal Reserve Bank, see e.g. Edwards
and Sinzdak, 1997, and Howells and Bain, 2005) do not charge any risk premium nor
transaction costs when lending money to financial intermediaries, and so do the later when
offering credit to firms and private investors. Although this is certainly an unrealistic
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hypothesis, it will provide us with an upper bound for the preference for liquidity of the
market, for raising the cost of capital induces individuals to reduce their levels of reserves.
Besides, since in general raising the level of the interest rate increases the elasticity of the
liquidity-preference function (as depicted in Figure 1), we will also obtain a lower bound
for this coefficient.
Figure 7: Preference for Liquidity and Demanded Reserves.
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Let r0 denote the Federal Funds Rate, then the optimal amount of reserves demanded
at the aggregate level is given by:
Kµ,σ(r0) = L · kµ,σ(r0) = L ·
[
σ · Φ−1(1− r0)− µ
]
(13)
The question of whether the crises episodes already described are corresponded to ad-
justments in the liquidity-preference and the demanded reserves functions is answered by
inspecting the graphs depicted in Figure 7.
Indeed, as depicted in the first column of Figure 7, both the preference for liquidity and
the demand for cash balances are sharply incremented around October 1987. In the case
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of the DowJones, the level of demanded reserves is multiplied by eight around October
1987 (going from about USD 2 MM to about USD 16 MM), a result that is compatible
with the fact that the liquidity demand was multiplied by five around October 87 (rising
from 1% to 5%), while the level of demanded cash-balances L was multiplied by 1.5 (rising
from less than USD 200 MM to about USD 300 MM). Regarding the Nasdaq, the level
of demanded reserves and the preference for liquidity were respectively amplified about
8 and 6 times, while the demand for cash balances was multiplied by 1.3 approximately.
Notice also that the effects of the crisis were endured in both industries, although the
magnitude of the required adjustment was greater for the DowJones composite index.
Finally, also the short-lasting nature of the event is captured by the liquidity-preference
function, since around October 1988 this coefficient had already attained the levels that
had predominated before the crisis erupted.
Regarding the episode of April 2000, as shown in the second column of Figure 7,
although the liquidity-preference of both indexes rose steadily from roughly the first
quarter of 1997 until the last quarter of 2002, most of the time the magnitude of this
coefficient is greater for the Nasdaq, specially after April 2000. The crisis signaled at
this point must then be regarded as one particular adjustment occurred at the middle
of a more extended period of turbulence primarily affecting the IT industry. Inspecting
the graph located to the lower right corner of Figure 7, we can additionally notice that
the increment in the preference for liquidity is partly compensated by a reduction in the
funds demanded for transactions L (see also Figure 4), in such a way that only from the
beginnings of the year 2000 until the end of 2003 the balances demanded for precautionary
motives surpassed the levels considered as normal up to that moment. However, since
the lift of the liquidity-preference of the Nasdaq is sharpest on April 2000, the burst of
the bubble can be established at this point, in accordance to the analysis of the previous
section.
In conclusion, the two episodes of crisis so far analised can be fully described by means
of the money demand functions defined in Equations 9 and 13, in the sense that not
only the moments when the bubbles bursted are precisely determined, also the main
characteristics of the crises are satisfactorily explained.
8 Maintaining Equilibrium with Adjustments in the Cost
of Capital
Let us now assume that firms peg their cash-to-risk ratios to a fixed proportion α, i.e.
m = K/L = α. Such could be a restriction established by a regulatory authority, but it
could be also imposed as a tacit requirement in markets with informational asymmetries.
As a matter of fact, when intermediaries cannot fully observe the portfolios held by their
customers, the leverage ratios provide a signal of the capacity to pay liabilities back and
thus explicitly affect the price of debt. The equilibrium internal return on risk under such
circumstances is obtained by replacing m = α in Equation 11:
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rα = 1− Φ
(
µ+ α
σ
)
(14)
Hence rα → 0.5 when σ →∞ (see Figure 3). In fact, as already stated in Section 5, under
regimes that maintain a constant relative stock of money, decreasing expected return and
increasing volatility are both markets trends that push the induced internal return rα to
the axis r = 0.5 (or push the market price of risk to zero) and consequently push the
market to more unstable states.
Figure 8: Internal Rate of Return on Risk (IRRR) and Interest Rate Elasticity of the
Liquidity Demand with Constant Relative Supply.
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From Equations 12 and 14, the following expression is obtained for the elasticity:
ǫα = −rασ
√
2π
α
· exp
[
(µ+ α)2
2σ2
]
(15)
Therefore, the sign of the interest rate elasticity is always negative, which means that
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increments of the cost of capital are always followed by reductions in the amount of
demanded cash balances and vice versa. Besides, the magnitude of the elasticity converges
to infinite when σ → ∞, i.e. |ǫα| → ∞ when σ → ∞. This result reinforces the claim
stated in the previous paragraph, that the market becomes more unstable as σ →∞ and
rα → 0.5.
The internal returns on risk and the elasticities of the demand for cash balances,
computed according to Equations 14 and 15, are respectively depicted in the first and the
second rows of Figure 8, when the cash-to-risk ratio is pegged to the level α = 1%. Notice
that jumps in rα and ǫr (rα) are produced around the episodes of crisis — in the same
way that this events were distinguished by jumps in the preference for liquidity when the
cost of capital was peg to the Federal Funds Rate in the previous section. In fact, around
October 1987, rα drastically rose to a historical maximum, while ǫr (rα) suddenly felt to
a historical minimum. Besides, the signal appeared in both indexes and its influence was
short-lasting, in accordance to the empirical facts characterising this crisis. Regarding
the episode of April 2000, the times of turbulence are located on a broader interval, with a
clear predominance of the signals related to the Nasdaq, in consistence with the fact that
only this index crashed on that date, and the most unexpected movements are produced
precisely in April 2000.
We can then conclude that many of the facts observed in stock markets can be sat-
isfactorily explained within the theoretical framework proposed in this paper. Notice,
however, that although in this context kµ,σ and the IRRR can be regarded as signals of
liquidity adjustments, such signals only appear after the corresponding events have been
produced and hence they cannot be used to make predictions. This is a consequence of
the fact that only a partial equilibrium approach has been followed in this paper and
hence the equilibrium ultimately depends on variables whose evolution is unknown (as it
is the case with L, µ and σ) and have to be treated in practice as exogenous variables.
Although this is certainly an important limitation, the model still provides a precise def-
inition of liquidity and of instability, capable of accounting for the behaviour of capital
markets both under normal circumstances and in times of turbulence — as illustrated
with the empirical analysis so far developed.
9 Conclusions
As long as in perfect capital markets funds can be lend and borrow without restrictions at
a single and exogenously determined interest rate, financial institutions can always adjust
their surpluses and accordingly, their market values do not depend on their capital struc-
tures (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, this mechanism does not work efficiently in
markets where opaque intermediaries establish contractual liabilities with credit sensitive
customers (Merton, 1974, 1977 and 1997). Within this framework, the role of financial
institutions is that of providing the services of hedging and diversification to customers
that cannot trade by themselves. Optimal option-based arrangements, contingent on the
outstanding surplus (equal to difference between the outstanding assets and liabilities) at
the maturity date, can then be issued to assure that the value of the firm is maximised
and the cost of insolvency is minimised.
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An alternative approach is proposed in this paper for the characterisation of markets
where intermediaries can only hedge and diversify up to a limited extent and are accord-
ingly obliged to rely on deposit insurance and capital cushions. The optimal contracts
are established in actuarial terms, in such a way that the expected insured capital gain
of the intermediary’s portfolio is maximised and the cost of bankruptcy is minimised (see
Equations 5 and 7), while the optimal liquidity demands are expressed as the quantile
function of the probability distributions describing risks (as in Equations 6 and 8).
The level of reserves demanded by the market is thereby characterised by the sum
of the surpluses demanded by investors, intermediaries and customers. As a result, the
market expected returns and volatilities are expressed as the weighted averages of the
mean returns and volatilities of the individual portfolios (see Equation 9). The role
of investors when deciding their balances in deregulated markets can then be related to
that of subsidiaries in decentralised organisations, where an internal cost of capital is given
and the total surplus is equal to the sum of the divisional contributions (see Merton and
Perold, 1993, and also Mierzejewski, 2006 and 2008).
More generally, when the supply of reserves is controlled by creditors, the cost of
capital is endogenously determined in order to satisfy the equilibrium in the market of
cash balances (as in Equations 10 and 11). In this context, the market interest rate
represents the return obtained when investing one monetary unit on risk and can be
accordingly regarded as the Internal Rate of Return on Risk (IRRR). Given any fixed pair
of liquidity supply and balances demanded for transactions, a risk-structure of interest
rates is determined in the plane of expected returns and volatilities (see Figures 2 and 3).
In conclusion, variations in the rate of growth of the funds spent on transactions or
in the stock of money must be necessarily followed by market adjustments reflected in
the relative prices of securities. Up to some extent, such movements will be compensated
by the internal return on risk, but also the mean return and the volatility of the market
portfolio are expected to be affected, for these parameters completely characterise risks
in a Gaussian setting. Different scenarios are thus corresponded to different combinations
of the involved parameters, some of which can be related to more stable and others to
more vulnerable states. In this way, both normal times, when credit is plentiful, as well
as times of financial turmoil, are possible in the model, depending on the flows of capital
and the paths followed by the risk parameters. The equilibrium mechanism of capital
markets is thus essentially physical in nature — and not only affected by psychological
and informational shocks. The predictions of the model can be verified by analysing the
historical data.
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